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THE IMPACT OF HOURS-OF-SERVICE
REGULATIONS ON TRANSPORTATION
PRODUCTIVITY AND SAFETY:
A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
FROM THE LITERATURE
Hokey Min

ABSTRACT
Since driver fatigue has known to be the primary cause of serious truck crashes, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) has attempted to implement new hours-of-service (HOS) regulations that aimed to promote
safer driving environments. The new HOS regulations effective on October T‘ of2005, however, may lead to substantial
cost increases for the trucking industry which will in turn hurt shippers and ultimately customers. For instance, motor
carriers may need to hire additional drivers to comply with new HOS regulations requiring that drivers be placed outof-service until they accumulated enough off-duty time. In particular, off-duty breaks required to refresh driving hours
were increased to 10 consecutive hours from the old rule of eight cumulative hours. A chronic shortage of truck drivers
coupled with new HOS regulations could further aggravate the driver recruitment and retention problems. In addition,
due to potential loading/unloading delays and stiffer fines /penalties resulting from new HOS regulations, trucking
productivity may decline. To help trucking firms cope with various challenges of new HOS regulations, this paper
provides a systematic overview ofprior literature that examines the impact of HOS on transportation productivity and
safety in the U.S. It also discusses managerial implications of new HOS regulations.

INTRODUCTION
The hours of service (HOS) regulations were first
introduced by the now-abolished Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) in 1937 as a way to protect the
safety of long-haul truckers. The HOS’s main purpose
is to prevent truck accidents caused by driver fatigue.
This is accomplished by limiting the number of driver
working hours per day and week. Driver working
hours include the time spent on loading, unloading,
driving, handling freight, preparing reports, preparing
vehicles for service, or performing any other duty
pertaining to the transportation of passengers or
property. The main reason for limiting driver working
hours is to prevent fatigue by keeping drivers on a 21to 24-hour schedule, maintaining a human body’s

natural sleep and wake cycle (so-called circadian
rhythm). Drivers are required to take a daily
minimum period of rest and are allowed longer
weekend rest periods to combat sleep deprivation,
cumulative fatigue, and time-on-task fatigue effects
that accrue on a weekly basis (Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, 2006). Despite their intent to
enhance traffic safety, HOS regulations have become
sources of controversy because it is hard for the policy
maker to determine exactly how long drivers should
work and sleep for their safety. As such, there were
numerous proposals to amend HOS regulations
between 1962 and 2009, but none were ever finalized
due to contentious debates over their effectiveness in
enhancing traffic safety.
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One of the most notable proposals of those includes
the highway reauthorization bill recently passed by
the U.S. House of Representatives, which contained
several important amendments for HOS regulations
that aimed to balance the requirement for highway
safety and the need for effective trucking services in
the United States. Amended HOS regulations
introduced by the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) in 2003 and 2005 were
generally well received by drivers, carriers, and
shippers, although carriers seek more flexible sleeper
berth rules. The main theme of the 2003 HOS rules is
to increase an opportunity for restorative sleep by
increasing the amount of off-duty time by two hours.
To elaborate, these rules allowed truck drivers to drive
a maximum of 11 hours after 10 consecutive hours off
duty. However, truck drivers are prohibited to drive
beyond the 14th hour after coming off duty, following
10 consecutive hours of duty. The 2003 HOS rules
were further refined in 2005 which remained virtually
unchanged as of 2008, because of a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Public Citizen et al. versus
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (374 F.3d
1209) on July 16, 2005, which stated the 2003 HOS
rules did not consider the impact of rules on driver
health (Blanchard, 2004). As summarized in Table 1,
the 2008 HOS rules intended to increase potential for
quality sleep by mandating commercial motor vehicle
(CMV) drivers to take at least 8 consecutive hours in
the sleeper berth plus two consecutive hours either in
the sleeper berth, off duty, or any combination of the
two.
Unfortunately, these amended regulations were still
attacked by the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and public safety advocacy groups such as
Public Citizen, Parents against Tired Truckers
(PATT), and Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways
(CRASH) despite the fact that truck crashes and
driver fatalities have fallen in the recent years even as
more freight has been moved since their enactment
(Cutler and Regan, 2007). To elaborate, the 2006 fatal
crash rate for large trucks stood at 1.93 fatal crashes
per 100 million vehicle-miles-traveled. This rate broke
the previous low of 1.97 fatal crashes per 100 million
vehicle-miles-traveled in 2002. The large truckinvolvement rate fell to 2.12 per 100 million vehicle
miles traveled, down from 2.21 a year earlier. The
fatality rate declined to 2.24 per 100 million vehiclemiles-traveled, down from 2.34 in 2005 (Business
Wire, 2008).
So, the fundamental questions still remain to be
answered:
50
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(1) Do these amended HOS rules save lives, or do
they put more lives at risk?
(2) Do these amended HOS rules improve carrier
operations and subsequently enhance trucking
productivity or do they put the trucking industry
in jeopardy and thus increase trucking business
failures?
Since the major goals of various interest groups are
varied and often conflicting, the implications of HOS
regulations have become one of the most controversial
topics in the United States. Those groups, such as
shippers, who are in favor of 2008 HOS rules have
advocated maintaining status quo or getting the 2008
HOS rules legislated into law, without FMCSA ever
addressing the above questions. On the other hand,
those groups, such as public safety advocacy groups,
who are opposed to the 2008 HOS rules have
supported enacting stricter controls over the trucking
industry on the premise that drivers who are allowed
more than 10 hours a day behind a wheel will get
fatigued and threaten the safety of the general public
on the road. Recognizing these contrasting views and
interpretations of the HOS rules, this paper intends to
gather factual evidence from the past scientific studies
regarding the HOS rules and their related issues such
as human fatigue, circadian rhythms, accident rates,
fatalities, potential carrier costs, and trucking
productivity and then validate some of the rationale
behind arguments made by various interest groups.
Specifically, the main objectives of this paper are to
1.

Synthesize the existing literature dealing with the
pros and cons of HOS rules with respect to their
safety and productivity implications;

2.

Identify key factors influencing driver fatigue,
reduced alertness, and driving task performance
based on the findings of the past studies;

3.

Clarify the myth surrounding the correlation
between HOS rules and transportation safety and
trucking business failures based on secondary
data analyses;

4.

Recommend best-practices and more productive
transportation strategies that can minimize driver
fatigue and improve driver productivity under new
HOS rules;

5.

Discuss the future outlook for extensions of
existing HOS literature and untapped research
topics relevant to HOS rules.

TABLE 1
RECENT CHANGES IN HOURS-OF-SERVICE RULES

May drive a maximum of 11 hours after 10
consecutive hours off duty.

No Change

May not drive beyond the 14th hour after coming off No Change
duty, following 10 consecutive hours off duty.
No Change
May not drive after 60 hours of duty in 7
consecutive days if the employing motor carrier
does not operate commercial motor vehicles every
day of the week.
• A driver may restart a 7 consecutive day period
after taking 34 or more consecutive hours off
duty.
May not drive after 70 hours of duty in 8
No Change
consecutive days if the employing motor carrier
operates commercial motor vehicles every day of
the week.
• A driver may restart a 8 consecutive day period
after taking 34 or more consecutive hours off
duty.
May not drive after the 14tn hour after coming on
No Change
duty 5 days a week or after the 16th hour after
coming on duty 2 days a week for those drivers who
operate within a 150-mile radius of their normal
work reporting location.
Commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers using a
CMV drivers using the sleeper berth provision must
sleeper berth must take 10 hours off duty, but may take at least 8 consecutive hours in the sleeper berth,
split sleeper berth tome into two periods provided plus 2 consecutive hours either in the sleeper berth, off
neither is less than 2 hours.duty, or any combination of the two,
Note: Passenger-carrying carrier/drivers are not subject to the above rules. These operations must comply with
the hours-of-service limitations in 49 CFR 395.5.

KEY HOS PREMISES AND THEIR RATIONALE
The human body typically functions on a 24-hour
cycle. To elaborate, most people’s biological clocks
work on a 25-hour cycle rather than a 24-hour cycle.
However, the human body’s biological cycle normally
follows the 24-hour cycle of the sun rather than the
human body’ innate cycle, because sunlight or other
bright lights can reset a pair of pinhead-sized brain
structures called suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) that
contain about 20,000 neurons (Koukkari and Sothern,
2006). This biological clock is set based on circadian

rhythms which dictate changes in the human’s mental
and physical characteristics in the course of a day.
These changes include: fluctuations in blood pressure,
heart rate, body temperature, hormones, memory,
reaction time, and attention span. Thus, circadian
rhythms influence total sleep hours, rest hours, and
subsequent restoration power of the human body
(Liskowsky, 1992).
In particular, the disruption of circadian rhythms
caused by irregular work patterns and sleep
deprivation that are common in long-haul truck
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driving can lead to serious driver fatigue and
performance decrement (Ogilvie and Wilkinson, 1984).
The cumulative driver fatigue would increase the
likelihood of the driver’s slow reaction, slow driving,
disorientation, poor gear change, poor steering, and
lane deviation and thus increase the risk of truck
crashes (Office of Technology Assessment, 1991). As a
matter of fact, a number of studies linked driver
fatigue to safety. For example, Van Cauter and Turek
(1990) observed that driver fatigue tended to
deteriorate driving performance and subsequently
increased accident rates. Similar conclusions were
drawn by Sweedler et al. (1990) and Mitler et al.
(1997) whose studies indicated that fatigue was one of
the most probable causes of many truck crashes in the
United States. Indeed, the U.S. National
Transportation Safety Board (2008) blamed driver
fatigue as a probable factor in 20-40% of truck crashes.
That is to say, when truck drivers become fatigued
from excessive driving/working hours and continuous
sleep deprivation (e.g., sleep apnoea, insomnia,
narcolepsy), they significantly increase the risk of
truck crashes that result in fatalities and serious
injuries. Considering this serious risk to public safety,
HOS’s main intent is to provide an increased
opportunity for truck drivers to obtain necessary rest
and restorative sleep. This intent of HOS, however, is
in conflict with the goal of many truck drivers whose
earnings depend heavily on the number of their
driving hours. The U.S. National Transportation
Safety Board (2008) estimated that the average
trucker drove 125,000 miles a year, and that was on
the low end of an average. The question remains how
one can compromise the number of driving hours
sufficient enough for truckers to make their ends
meet, while not too long for them to lose their
circadian rhythms and necessary daily sleeps.
An answer to the above question hinges on the
threshold of sleep deprivation that can adversely
affect driving performance and begin to pose a serious
danger to both truck drivers and others on the road.
One of the clues can be found in several recent studies
that examined the impact of partial and full sleep
deprivation on driving impairment such as lane
keeping performances. These studies include
Fairclough and Graham (1999) who discovered that
the effect of one night sleep deprivation was
equivalent to that of 0.07% blood alcohol content
(BAC). Similarly, Arnedt et al. (2001) found that the
impact of 21 hours of driving without any sleep on
driving performance was equivalent to that of 0.08%
of BAC. Driving with such a level of BAC is illegal in
most of the U.S. since that level of BAC would
increase the risk of fatal vehicle crashes by three to 17
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times more (Heng et al., 2006). Amundsen and
Sagberg (2003) also discovered that even a small
reduction in sleep (e.g., restricting sleep less than
seven hours) could triple the accident risk.
Considering such risk, 2003 HOS aimed to move
towards a 24-hour work-rest cycle, enhance the
opportunity for restorative sleep by increasing the
amount of off-duty time by two hours, and strike a
balance between uniform, consistent enforcement, and
operational flexibility. As shown in Table 2, Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) under
the U.S. Department of Transportation (2003)
estimated that 2003 HOS would save up to 75 lives
and prevent as many as 1,326 fatigue-related crashes
annually (http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/news/newsreleases/2003/052703.asp).
Taking a step further, new 2008 HOS rules effective
on January 19th of 2009 require 10 consecutive hours
of off-duty time to increase the potential for quality
sleep. However, the new HOS rules may lead to
substantial cost increases for the trucking industry
which will in turn hurt shippers and ultimately
customers. For instance, the trucking industry may
need to hire additional 84.000 drivers to comply with
the new HOS rules requiring that drivers be placed
out-of-service until they accumulated enough off-duty
time. In particular, off-duty breaks required to refresh
driving hours were increased to 10 consecutive hours
from the old rule of eight consecutive hours. A chronic
shortage of truck drivers coupled with the new HOS
rules could further aggravate the driver recruitment
and retention problem. In addition, due to potential
loading/unloading delays and stiffer fines/penalties
(between $550 and $11,000 per violation depending on
the severity) imposed by the new HOS rules, motor
carriers such as Schneider National estimated that
trucking productivity would decline by 4-19% (WERC,
2004). Similarly, the new HOS rules stipulated that
drivers would be considered on duty when loading and
unloading or waiting to clear customary paperwork.
For this reason, most observers anticipate significant
productivity losses--in some cases approaching 20%-particularly for truckload carriers. As such, Wal-Mart
expected the new HOS rules to add $25 million to the
cost of new drivers and tractors alone (Clair and Fox,
2004). Furthermore, a HOS compliance cost can add a
significant burden to the trucking industry. For
example, the purchase and installation of an electronic
on-board recorder (EOBR) could cost the trucker more
than $2,000. Its annual operating and maintenance
cost of $200 should be factored into the cost estimate
as well. Also, drivers averaged 20 minutes of time to
write logs for each trip and fleet managers typically
spent 20 minutes a month to review and monitor

TABLE 2
TRAFFIC SAFETY RECORD AND HOS EFFECTS FOR LARGE TRUCKS (GROSS VEHICLE
WEIGHT RATING EXCEEDING 10,000 POUNDS)
2001-2003 total number of large truck involved in crashes

141.000 crashes

2001-2003 total number of large truck involved in fatigue-related
crashes

18.000 crashes

1997-2000 average fatalities in fatigue-related crashes

375 people

1997-2000 average injuries in fatigue-related crashes

7,500 people

1997-1999 average cost per truck crash

$62,613

2002 total cost of fatigue-related crashes

$2.3 billion

Lives that could have been saved in 2002 by 100% HOS compliance
Estimated annual cost savings to motor carriers by 100% HOS
compliance
Net benefits of HOS rules

75 to 120 people
$900 million to $1.3 billion
$600 million to $1.1 billion per
year

Source: FMCSA (2005), Commercial Motor Vehicle Facts, http://www.truckbrakesafety.com/pdf7articles/fmcsafacts-figures.pdf; FMCSA (2008), The Large Truck Crash Causation Study, http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/factsresearch/research-technology/analysis/FMCSA-RRA-07-017.htm.

driver compliances; thus, HOS compliance efforts
would be detrimental to trucking productivity (Barnes,
2000). Complicating the HOS compliance efforts, new
HOS rules can be interpreted in many different ways
since FMCSA officials have no plans to issue a
clarification to the rules (Adams, 2005). For example,
the rules do not regulate how off duty hours must be
used, how a mandatory two rest-break should be
utilized, and what the parameters of a continuous 14
shift should be. Thus, many drivers may end up taking
odd nap times, trying to travel hundreds of miles
without a proper rest-break, and feeling the increased
pressure of meeting delivery times.
THE DRIVER FATIGUE MODEL
As discussed earlier, the leading cause of truck
accidents is driver fatigue. In fact, driver fatigue was
the primary cause of 2% to 23% of all truck crashes
(O’Hanlon 1978, Horne and Reyner, 1995). Reissmann
(1997) also discovered that drowsy drivers were
responsible for 50% of the fatal vehicle crashes on the
Pennsylvania Turnpike and New York Thruway. In
particular, driver fatigue is overrepresented in

accidents during nighttime, single-vehicle accidents,
high-speed (especially more than 90 miles) accidents,
and accidents on monotonous roads (Sagberg, 1999;
Amundsen and Sagberg, 2003). A recent study
conducted by the Adelaide Centre for Sleep Research
showed that drivers who have been awake for 24
hours have an equivalent driving performance to a
person who has a BAC (blood alcohol content) of 0.1
g/lOOml are seven times more likely to have an
accident (http://www.smartmotorist.com/traffic-andsafety-guideline/driver-fatigue-is-an-important-causeof-road-crashes.html, 2008).
The typical symptoms of driver fatigue include groggy
and exhaustive feeling, frequent yawning, strained
eyes, daydreaming while on the road, driving right of
center, driving with varying speed, and experiencing
short bursts of microsleep (i.e., a lapse from wake to
sleep that lasts only a few seconds). One of the ironies
of driver fatigue is that the driver may be too tired to
determine his/her own level of fatigue
(http://www.sleep-deprivation.com/articles/causes-ofsleep-deprivation/driver-fatigue.php, 2008). Since
driver fatigue reduces driver alertness and adversely

Fall 2009

53

affects driver performance, it has been the central
theme of the various HOS rules. Thus, it is important
for us to understand what causes driver fatigue and
how significantly driver fatigue influences truck
safety. To increase such understanding, we developed
a driver fatigue model based on the findings of prior
studies and theory postulated by human biology and
behavioral science.
Factors Influencing Driver Fatigue
Driver fatigue is affected by a multitude of factors
encompassing human biology (e.g., circadian
rhythms), working environments (e.g., time on the
road), working schedules (e.g., trip schedules), and
work demand (e.g., breaks). Among those factors, a
circadian rhythm is generally known to be one of the
most important factors contributing to driver fatigue
since it directly affects a driver’s psychological
processes and mental functions such as memory,
reaction time, manual dexterity, and feel of alertness
that, in turn, influence driver performance (Office of
Technology Assessment, 1991; Dawson et al., 2001;
Fletcher and Dawson, 2001). Figure 1 shows howdriver fatigue can increase the risk of truck crashes.
To complicate the driver fatigue model, the circadian
rhythm is intertwined with a driver’s individual
characteristics (e.g., age, fitness, driving experience,
sleep disorders, medical conditions), monotonous
working environments creating boredom (e.g., straight
driving with a lack of stimulation), and work
schedules (e.g., nighttime driving, long working hours,
cumulative sleep debt, irregular rest periods) (Brown,
1993; Crum et ah, 2001; Eskandarian, 2007). Figure 2
displays the correlation between these attributes and
driver fatigue. In the next sub-sections, we will
elaborate on the effect of some of these factors on
driver performance and subsequent truck safety.
Driver age. It is a common perception that younger
drivers are likely to get involved in accidents due to
their lack of driving experience and recklessness.
Thus, a combination of driver fatigue and youth can be
a deadly mix for potential vehicle crashes. Regardless,
the findings of prior studies examining the link
between driver age and fatigue are not conclusive. For
example, although there were large differences among
drivers in levels of alertness and performance, a driver
fatigue and alertness study conducted by FMCSA
(1997) showed no significant relationships between
driver age and fatigue. On the other hand, Horne et ah
(2002) indicated that younger drivers had a somewhat
higher risk of being involved in fatigue-related
accidents than older drivers. This finding is somewhat
contrary to an observation made by Reissman (1997)
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that younger drivers often have greater flexibility
adjusting to new sleep patterns than older drivers do.
Also, Campagne et ah (2004) compared the
performance of three age groups in a driving simulator
study and found that deterioration of vigilance was
correlated with driving errors for drivers aged 60 and
above.
Another study conducted by Summala and Mikkola
(1994) showed that record road accidents among 18-20
old drivers peaked during midnight to 6a.m., whereas
the accidents caused by drivers over 50 years old
peaked during the late afternoon hours. More recently,
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2008) discovered
that fatigued drivers under 29 years of age had a
higher risk of vehicle crashes than those over 50 years
old. It also showed a significant relationship between
the age of the fatigued driver and the type of fatiguerelated crash (single vehicle or head-on). Single
vehicle crashes involved a higher proportion of
fatigued drivers under 29 years of age compared with
head-on crashes. However, fatigued drivers over 50
years of age were involved in more head-on crashes.
This relationship might be linked to the time of crash.
That is to say, single vehicle crashes are more likely to
occur in the early morning and early morning crashes
are more likely to involve fatigued drivers under 29
years of age. A similar logic could explain the
relationship between older fatigued drivers and headon crashes. Therefore, age can be a mediating factor
for accidental risk. However, its importance to driver
fatigue is unclear.
Obesity. Stoohs et al. (1994) found that obese truck
drivers had a two-fold higher accident rate per mile
than non-obese drivers. Similarly, a recent 15-month
empirical study conducted by Park et al. (2009)
subjected 456 commercial truck drivers to screenings
for an obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) which disrupts
sleep and results in daytime sleepiness, sleep attacks
or “nodding off”, impaired psychomotor ability, and
poor decision-making ability. The study reported that
approximately 2.4 - 3.9 million licensed commercial
drivers in the U.S. might suffer from OSA due to their
obesity, which would likely cause them to fall asleep at
the wheel more frequently than physically-fitting
drivers and thus increase accident risks.
Long driving hours. Long-haul drivers represent
about half of the registered truck fleet in the U.S., but
were involved in more than 90% of fatal truck crashes
(FMCSA, 2003). This may be due to the fact that long
haul (i.e., trips of 100 miles or more from the driver’s
home base) requires longer driving hours and thus
increases the risk of vehicle crashes. Indeed, the
relative risk of truck drivers who have driven more
than eight hours was almost twice as high as those
who drove lesser hours (Kaneko and Jovanis, 1990;

FIGURE 1
THE DRIVER FATIGUE INFLUENCE DIAGRAM

FIGURE 2
FACTORS INFLUENCING DRIVER FATIGUE

Adapted and modified from Dawson, D., Feyer, A.M., Grander, P., Hartley, L., Haworth, N., and
Source:
Williamson, A. (2001), Fatigue Expert Group: Options for Regulatory Approach to Fatigue in Drivers
of Heavy Vehicles in Australia and New Zealand, Unpublished Discussion Paper, Melbourne,
Australia: Australian Transportation Safety Board.
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Braver et al., 1999; Heaton, 2005). Similarly,
Mukherjee et al. (2006) discovered that a restriction
on trips of no more than eight hours would reduce
truck fatalities by 3-5% as compared to no such
restriction.
Flexible driver schedules. Mackie and Miller (1978)
observed that driving performance among truck
drivers started declining after 5 hours of driving for
drivers with irregular schedules as compared to 8
hours for drivers with regular schedules. As such,
driver schedules can influence driver performance and
the subsequent risk of truck crashes. Considering the
impact of driver schedules on driver safety, a growing
number of trucking firms have considered driverfriendly schedules, such as flexible schedules. For
instance, flexible driver schedules resulting from the
24-hour restart provision often allow drivers to
maintain a more routine (so-called rhythmic) driving
schedule because they prevent the drivers from
driving at odd hours and decrease off-duty time
driving. As a result, a majority of drivers believed that
such schedules would help them spend more time at
home, increase their income, and thus improve their
safety (Griffin et al., 1992).
Driver income. Truck drivers earn relatively low
hourly wages as compared to most other comparable
jobs (Belzer et al., 2002). To make matters worse,
many drivers (especially non-union drivers) typically
get paid only by the mile with no separate pay for non
driving work, such as their waiting and loading/
unloading time at the dock. Under the current HOS
rules, the opportunity cost of non-driving work can be
too high for many drivers. This peculiar situation will
force some drivers to violate the HOS rules and drive
longer hours without sufficient breaks to make their
ends meet and increase the risk of truck crashes.
Indeed, the violations of HOS rules are on the steady
rise. For example, 3.8% of the road-check inspection of
motor carriers resulted in out-of-service conditions for
HOS violations in 2005 that was slightly up from
3.44% in 2004 (Logistics Today, 2005). Braver et al.
(1992) found that truck drivers who violated the HOS
rules are more likely to fall asleep at the wheel and
thus increase the risk of truck crashes. Thus,
inadequate driver compensation may have a harmful
effect on driver safety. Some studies such as Griffin et
al. (1992) suggested that for every one cent increase in
driver pay, there would be an 11.1% decrease in truck
crash probability.
Monotonous driving. Due to a lack of stimuli, the
monotony of road conditions can increase driver
boredom and decrease driver performance. For
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example, driving performance degrades at a faster
rate on straight road sections than on curves
(Desmond and Mathews, 1998). In particular, sleep
related accidents may be more common on long
stretches of interstate highways and may account for
40% of fatal accidents (Shafer, 1993; McCartt et al.,
1996). Likewise, driver fatigue is likely to occur much
earlier when driving on straight, rural roads (Fell,
1994; Thiffault and Bergeron, 2003).
Vehicle speed. Since vehicle speed can either shorten
or lengthen the truck driver’s driving hours, potential
traffic congestion and road construction along the
driver’s designated route can influence driver fatigue
and the subsequent driver safety. Considering the
potential link between vehicle speed and driver safety,
both Malandraki and Daskin (1992) and Donati et al.
(2006) developed a step function with consecutive time
intervals that took into account changes in vehicle
speed due to traffic congestions and unexpected delays
on the road. Their studies revealed interdependence
between vehicle speed and driver schedules/truck
routes that, in turn, influence driver fatigue.
Preventive Measures for Driver Fatigue and
Truck Crashes
As summarized in Table 2, driver fatigue can result in
truck crashes and the subsequent fatalities, injuries,
and property damages, and thereby burden motor
carriers with a substantial amount of financial losses
and decreased productivity. In the era of intensified
competition in the trucking industry, motor carriers
should develop viable guidelines to alleviate driver
fatigue and then prevent the potential truck
accidents/crashes, while complying with the HOS
rules. With that in mind, we propose the following
“best-practice” guidelines:
• Crum and Morrow (2002) found that starting the
work week tired was the single most important
factor influencing truck driver fatigue. To ensure
adequate rest before the beginning of the work
week, trucking firms should discourage long-haul
drivers to follow disjoint sleep patterns and
encourages them to have at least five hours of
uninterrupted sleep by developing driver
routes/schedules (especially post-trip) that allow
frequent stops at home;
• To make the effective use of a driver’s time to get
adequate rest, trucking firms should minimize or
eliminate the time a driver spends to count, load,
and complete the paperwork, while minimizing the
assistance of unnecessary lumpers who may prolong

the unloading time. Also, it is known that drivers
tended to be more awake after lumping in the
morning, but grew tired after lumping in the
afternoon (Barnes, 2000). In other words, trucking
firms need to find “driver-friendly” freight (e.g.,
automotive parts, grocery/food items, paper
delivery) whenever possible;
To minimize waiting/idle time at the unloading dock
that takes away a driver’s rest time and earning
opportunities, trucking firms should consider using
“drop-and-hook” options more frequently. In a
typical drop-and-hook operation, the driver drops off
a fully loaded trailer in the warehouse/distribution
center yard and then hauls away an empty one
without waiting for unloading. Thus, it saves the
driver’s waiting time. Also, this practice reduces
fuel costs and carbon footprints since it eliminates
the need for the truck to sit in the warehouse yard
with its engine idling;
To prolong the quality rest break, trucking firms
should direct and encourage truck drivers to fullservice rest stops where they can combine non
driving activities such as meal stops, stretches,
refueling, shower, laundry, and social hours with
the other drivers. Given the nationwide shortages of
rest areas, the use of global positioning systems
(GPS) along with satellite communication systems
to locate nearest rest areas may be essential. Also,
truck routes/delivery schedules should be
restructured in such a way that drivers can have a
greater access to these rest areas;
According to Braver et al. (1992), the main reason
why drivers violated the HOS rules are irregular
route driving, penalty for late arrivals, carrying
perishable goods, and being assigned unrealistic
delivery deadlines. To minimize instances of HOS
violations by truck drivers, trucking firms should
negotiate with their shippers to allow the drivers to
arrive at any time up to a certain time and day with
open (soft) time windows as opposed to strict (fixedschedule) delivery deadlines (Nixon, 2005). Also, the
increased use of relay and team driving may help
reduce the adverse impact of irregular route driving
on the drivers;
If the truck breaks down in the middle of the road,
its driver would waste his/her valuable time for
adequate rest and force the driver to catch up with
his/her lost time by driving faster. Thus, thorough

pre-trip inspection and preventive maintenance of
the truck will help drivers make better use of their
on-the-road off-duty time and subsequently reduce
the potential risk of fatigue-related truck crashes.
The recent study conducted by NAVTEQ indicated
that the use of a real-time navigation system which
could alert drivers about unexpected traffic delays and
ongoing road construction activities would help drivers
save 18% of driving time on an average trip and
increase fuel efficiency (Industry News, 2009).
Considering this benefit, long-haul drivers may take
advantage of this kind of device to better utilize their
driving hours and thus increase non-driving
restorative periods.
MYTHS ABOUT HOS IMPACTS USING
SECONDARY DATA ANALYSIS
As discussed earlier, there were conflicting reports
regarding the impact of HOS amendments on traffic
safety in terms of reduced truck crashes. To further
investigate the validity of this impact, we summarized
the secondary data available from the U.S.
Department of Transportation. As shown in Table 3,
truck crashes declined a year after 2000, 2003 and
2005 HOS amendments despite steady increases in
the number of vehicle miles, whereas those figures
increased a year after 1996 HOS amendment.
However, truck crashes seem to climb back gradually
two year after each HOS amendment. As a matter of
fact, the Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that there
was no statistically significant difference (p-value =
0.144) in truck crash statistics between four years
before and after 2003 HOS amendment. Thus, it is
difficult to make any concrete conclusions about the
impact of HOS on traffic safety. To settle controversies
surrounding the impact of HOS on the trucking
industry, we looked at trucking business failures as a
surrogate measure of the financial health of the
trucking industry. As displayed in Figure 3, although
there is a surge in trucking business failures in the
third quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001,
past patterns of the trucking business failures tend to
be cyclical and thus have little to do with any
particular government mandates or rules. Instead,
increases in trucking business failures seemed to be
more correlated with economic downturns than any
particular government policies or rules such as HOS
amendments. For example, dramatic increases in
trucking business failures in 2001 and 2007 coincided
with recessionary economies during those years.
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TABLE 3
CRASH RECORD FOR LARGE TRUCKS (GROSS VEHICLE WEIGHT RATING EXCEEDING
10,000 POUNDS) DURING THE PERIOD OF 1990 THROUGH 2007
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Aver
Note:

Recession vear?
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Trucks involved in crashes in total
384,776
330,347
376,035
397,328
460.644
377,472
39j^55

Vehicle miles in millions
146,242
149,543
153,384
159,888
170,216
178,156

411,955
474,920
456.955
429,823
434,587
456.721
415,902
440.951
384,766
413,584
411,459 (39.461)

196,380
202.688
205.520
209,032
214,603
217.917
220,792
222,523
222,513
226,963
172,711 (84,076)

Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations.

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, National Center
for Statistics and Analysis, Traffic Safety Facts 2007, Final Edition (Washington, DC), available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/ as of March 2009.

FIGURE 3
TRUCKING BUSINESS FAILURES DURING THE PERIOD OF 1990 THROUGH 2008
Total Trucking Business Failures
(Companies with 5 or more Trucks)
(Q1 1990- Q3 2008)

Source: Avondale Partners, LLC, American Trucking Association (2008)
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CONCLUSIONS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Since the inception of HOS regulations in 1939, these
regulations have been controversial. Even the series of
their amendments in 1962,1996, 2000, 2003, and 2005
have failed to stop controversies and silence critics.
The center of the controversies often lies in the
misinterpretation and misunderstanding of their
impact on reduction in driver fatigue and increase in
driver safety/productivity. To compound the moot
point surrounding HOS regulations, some study
findings regarding the impact of HOS rules on driver
safety are incongruent and inconsistent with each
other. Thus, there is a great need for us to synthesize
these study findings and discern real facts from
misconceptions. With that in mind, this paper
thoroughly reviewed various forms of prior studies
including empirical, exploratory, case, and analytical
studies that investigated the various effects of HOS
rules on driver fatigue and safety, while analyzing
secondary data sources available from the public
domain. Based on the review of prior literature and
secondary data sources, we can draw the following
conclusions:
• The disruption of a truck driver’s circadian rhythms
resulting from irregular work or rest patterns is one
of the most important reasons for driver fatigue. As
driver fatigue increases, driver safety decreases due
to a lack of reaction time, dexterity, memory,
cognition, and feeling of alertness associated with
driver fatigue. Thus, a series of HOS rules
introduced in the past aimed to reduce driver
fatigue by not only limiting the truck driver’s duty
hours, but also increasing off-duty rest periods.
Despite this intention, HOS rules have become a
constant source of controversies due to their
oversight of long haul trucking practices. By nature,
long haul trucking is characterized by extended and
irregular duty hours that are often affected by many
interwoven factors such as delivery schedules
(including restricted time windows, nighttime
driving), geographical customer bases, truck routes,
driver shifts, driver earning opportunities, driver
ldle/waiting time at the loading/unloading docks,
and number of different time zones that drivers
need to pass. Thus, the effectiveness of HOS rules
should be assessed holistically rather than being
judged by their influence on each factor.•
• For a variety of reasons including the carrier’s
delivery service commitments and the driver’s
concerns over his/her income, many drivers across
the U.S. and Canada seemed to knowingly violate

the HOS rules. Although electronic monitoring
(through on-board recorders) of driver logs is
available, its reliability is still questionable and the
strict enforcement of the HOS rules on violators
would significantly increase compliance costs for
both carriers and federal agencies such as FMCSA.
Thus, the FMCSA may need to ease the driver’s
burden of writing logs and reduce the dispatch
manager’s time to review and administer driver
compliance regulations by reducing the frequency of
writing logs and reviewing records.
• In addition to driver fatigue, truck driving
environments such as the number of rest stops,
dedicated parking areas, and road conditions (e.g.,
straight rural roads) are attributed to driver safety.
Since the improvements of these environments
require the state/federal governments’ extensive
time and monetary investments in transportation
infrastructure, these environments are considered
“given.” Thus, dispatchers should be aware of these
environments and restructure truck routes that can
be adapted to these environments.
• It is inconclusive that HOS amendments drastically
reduced traffic safety. Likewise, it is difficult for us
to pinpoint the adverse economic impact of HOS
amendments on the trucking industry from the
macro-economic standpoint, although HOS
compliances and enforcements will be costly.
As summarized above, various studies have been
conducted to identify the sources of driver fatigues and
their impact on trucking safety. However, there is still
void left to fill in the literature to assess the
effectiveness of HOS rules holistically. To point the
right direction for future research endeavors, we
suggest the following selected line of research topic
areas that can help trucking firms improve
transportation strategies in accordance with new HOS
rules.
• Develop the best combination of duty and off-duty
periods that add up to normal 24-hour circadian
rhythms by simulating various combinations of duty
and off-duty periods;
• Estimate the minimum recuperation time needed to
compensate for interrupted sleep time by comparing
various combinations of flexible driving schedules
(e.g., shorter away from home versus longer athome periods, Monday driving after home rests
versus Friday driving after long driving on the
road);
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Examine the effects of nighttime driving between
midnight and 6:00 a.m. on driver safety with
required off-duty periods that enable restorative
sleep for drivers involving such nighttime driving
versus without those required off-duty periods;
Assess the impact of lumper hiring on the driver’s
productivity and fatigue;
Determine the adequacy of sleep obtained in cab
sleep-berth in comparison to sleep at the full service
rest areas;
Identify warning signals for potential truck
accidents such as the driver’s eye movement, eye-lid
droop, and lane violations and then develop
strategies/devices to monitor such signals;
Develop profiles (e.g., age, gender, experience,
physical fit) of truck drivers who are more prone to
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Business First, Vol. 22, No. 13, pp. 61-62.
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cause accidents as a result of fatigue by using datamining techniques;
• Assess the economic impact of mandated electronic
on-board recorders on long-haul operations and
team/relay driving;
• Evaluate the impact of monetary incentives for
drivers complying with the HOS rules on their
productivity and safety records.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was partly funded by the Intermodal
Transport Institute (ITI) at the University of Toledo
and the U.S. Department of Transportation. The
author also would like to express sincere gratitude to
anonymous reviewers for their constructive critiques
that helped improve the quality of this paper.

Belzer, M.H., Fulton, G.A., Grimes, D.R., Saltzman,
G.M., Sedo, S., and Schmidt, L.G. (2002), Proposed
Changes in Motor Carrier Hours of Service
Regulations: An Assessment, Unpublished Report,
Ann Arbor, MI: Transportation Research
Institute, University of Michigan.
Blanchard, D. (2004), “Now What? Hours of Service
Rules Struck Down by Court of Appeals,”
Logistics Today, August, pp. 1-2.
Braver, E., Preusser, C., Preusser, D., Baum, H.,
Beilock, R., and Ulmer, R. (1992), “Long Hours
and Fatigue: A Study of Tractor-Trailer Drivers.”
Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp.
341-366.

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2008), Fatiguerelated Crashes: An Analysis of Fatigue-related
Crashes on Australian Roads using an
Operational Definition of Fatigue, Melbourne,
Australia: Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport
and Regional Economics.

Braver, E.R., Preusser, C.W., and Ulmer, R.G. (1999),
“How Long-Haul Motor Carriers Determine Truck
Driver Work Schedules and the Role of Shipper
Demands,” Journal of Safety Research, Vol. 30.
No. 3, pp. 193-204.

Barnes, D. (2000), “Proposal to Reignite Battle over
Fatigue Research,” Transport Topics, May 8, p.
6.

Brown, I.D. (1993), “Driver Fatigue and Road
Safety,” Alcohol, Drugs and Driving, Vol. 9, No.
3/<, pp. 239-252.

60

Journal of Transportation Management

Business Wire (2008), “Truck-Involved Fatal Crash
Statistics Fall to All-Time Low,” February 8,
www.allbusiness.com/government/governmentbodies-office-us-federal-government/6641162l.html, retrieved on October 19, 2009.
Clair, L.A. and Fox, S.D. (2004), “Time to Simplify
Trucking Tariffs,” Supply Chain Management
Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 36-42.
Crum, M.R. and Morrow, P.C. (2002), “The Influence
of Carrier Scheduling Practices on Truck Driver
Fatigue,” Transportation Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1,
pp. 20-41.
Crum, M.R., Morrow, P.C., Olsgard, P., and Roke, P.J.
(2001), “Truck Driving Environments and their
Influence on Driver Fatigue and Crash Rates,”
Transportation Research Record: Journal of the
Transportation Research Board, No. 1779, pp. 125133.
Cutler, J. and Regan, M. (2007), “Hours of Service
Development,” Logistics Quarterly, Vol. 13, No.
5, p. 53.

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration under
U.S. Department of Transportation (1996),
Commercial Motor Vehicle/Driver Fatigue and
Alertness Study, http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/factsrese arch/research-technology/publications/
cmvfatiguestudy.htm.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration under
U.S. Department of Transportation (2003),
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/news/newsreleases/2003/052703.asp.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (2006),
Hours of Service of Drivers: Driver Rest and Sleep
for Safe Operations: Proposed Rule, Washington
DC: U.S. Department of Transportation.
Fell, D. (1994), Safety Update: Problem Definition and
Countermeasure Summary: Fatigue, Unpublished
Report RUS No. 5, New South Wales, Australia:
New South Wales Road Safety Bureau.
Fletcher, A. and Dawson, D. (2001), “Field-based
Validations of a Work-related Fatigue Model
based on Hours of Work,” Transportation
Research, Vol. F4, pp. 75-88.

Dawson, D., Feyer, A.M., Grander, P., Hartley, L.,
Haworth, N., and Williamson, A. (2001), Fatigue
Expert Group: Options for Regulatory Approach to
Fatigue in Drivers of Heavy Vehicles in Australia
and New Zealand, Unpublished Discussion Paper,
Melbourne, Australia: Australian Transportation
Safety Board.

Griffin, G., Rodriguez, J., and Lantz, B. (1992),
Evaluation of the Impact of Changes in the
Hours of Service Regulations on Efficiency,
Drivers, and Safety, Publication No. 93, Fargo,
ND: Upper Great Plains Transportation
Institute, North Dakota State University.

Desmond, P. A., and Matthews, G. (1996), “TaskInduced Fatigue Effects on Simulated Driving
Performance,” Vision in Vehicles VI, A. G. Gale,
ed., Amsterdam, Netherlands: North-Holland.

Heaton, K. (2005), “Truck Driver Hours of Service
Regulations: The Collision of Policy and Public
Health,” Policy, Politics, & Nursing Practice,
Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 277-284.

Donati, A., Montemanni, R., Casagrande, N., Rizzoli,
A., and Gambardella, L. (2006), “Time Dependent
Vehicle Routing Problem with a Multi Ant Colony
System,” European Journal of Operational
Research, Vol. 185, pp. 1174- 1191.

Heng, K., Hargarten, S., Layde, P., Craven, A. and
Zhu, S. (2006), “Moderate Alcohol Intake and
Motor Vehicle Crashes: The Conflict between
Health Advantage and At-risk Use,” Alcohol and
Alcoholism, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 451-454.

Eskandanan, A., Sayed, R., Delaigue, P., Blum, J.,
and Mortazavi, A. (2007), Advanced Driver
Fatigue Research, Technical Report, Ashburn, VA:
Center for Intelligent Systems Research, George
Washington University.

Horne, J.A., Reyner, L.A., Baulk, S.D., and Flatley, D.
(2002), “Driver Sleepiness: Overview of Recent
Findings from Loughborough Sleep Research
Centre,” in Behavioral Research in Road Safety
2001, U.K. Department of Transportation.

Fairclough, S.H. and Graham, R. (1999), “Impairment
of Driving Performance caused by Sleep
Deprivation or Alcohol: A Comparative Study,”
Human Factor, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 118-128.

Industry News (2009), “Real-Time Traffic Enabled
Navigation System Can Save Drivers 4 Days a
Year,” http://www.egmcartech.com/2009/08/29/
study -real-time- traffic-enabled-na vigationFall 2009

61

systems-can-save-drivers-4-days-a-year/, retrieved
on October 19, 2009.
Kaneko, T. and Jovanis, P.P. (1990), Multiday Driving
Patterns and Motor Carrier Accident Risk: A
Disaggregate Analysis, Davis, CA: Institute of
Transportation Studies, University of California
at Davis, Research Report UCD-ITS-RR-90-09.

Park, P.D., Durand, G., Tsismenakis, A., Vela-Bueno,
A., and Kales, S. (2009), “Screening for
Obstructive Sleep Apnea during Commercial
Driver Medical Examinations,” Journal of
Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Vol.
51, No. 3, pp 275-282

Koukkari, W.L. and Sothern, R.B. (2006), Introducing
Biological Rhythms, New York, NY: Springer.

Reissman, C.J. (1997), The Alert Driver: A Trucker’s
Guide to Sleep, Fatigue, and Rest in our 24-Hour
Society, Alexandria, VA: American Trucking
Associations, Inc.

Liskowsky, D.R. (2007), “Biological Rhythms and Shift
Work,” Journal of the American Medical
Association, Vol. 268, No. 21, p. 3047.

Sagberg, F. (1999), “Road Accidents caused by Drivers
Failing Asleep,” Accident Analysis and Prevention,
Vol. 31, No. 6, pp. 639-649.

Logistics Today (2005), “Hours of Service Violations
are on the Rise,” Logistics Today, Vol. 46, No. 6,

Shafer, J.H. (1993), “The Decline of Fatigue Related
Accidents on NYS Thruway,” Proceedings of the
Highway Safety Forum on Fatigue, Sleep
Disorders and Traffic Safety, Albany, NY.

P-1.

Mackie, R., and Miller, C. (1978), “Effects of Hours of
Service, Regularity of Schedules and Cargo
Loading on Truck and Bus Driving Fatigue,”
Coleta, C, Technical Report No. 1765-F.
Malandraki, C. and Daskin, M., (1992) “Time
dependent vehicle routing problems:
Formulations, Properties, and Heuristic
Algorithms” Transportation Science, 26(33), 185200.
Mitler, M.M., Miller, J.C., and Lipsitz, J.J. (1997),
“The Sleep of Long-haul Truck Drivers,” New
England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 337, pp.755761.
Mukherjee, A., Hall, R.W., and Shen, Z. (2006),
Bounds of Effectiveness, Costs, and Benefits of
Driver Hours of Service Regulations for Freight
Carriers, Unpublished Report, Metrans Project 0510, Los Angeles, CA: Epstein Department of
Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of
Southern California.
Office of Technology Assessment (1991), Biological
Rhythms: Implications for the Worker, Washington
DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Ogilvie, R.D. and Wilkinson, R.T. (1984), “The
Detection of Sleep Onset: Behavioral and
Physiological Convergence,” Psychophysiology,
Vol. 21, No. 5, pp.510-520.

62

Journal of Transportation Management

Stoohs, R.A., Guilleminault, C., Itoi, A., and Dement,
W.C. (1994), “Traffic Accidents among Commercial
Long-Haul Truck Drivers: The Influence of SleepDisordered Breathing and Obesity,” Sleep, Vol. 17,
No. 7, pp. 619-623.
Summala. H. and Mikkola, T. (1994), “Fatal Accidents
among Car and Truck Drivers: Effects of Fatigue,
Age, and Alcohol Consumption," Human Factors,
Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 315-326.
Thiffault, P. and Bergeron, J. (2003), “Fatigue and
Individual Differences in Monotonous Simulated
Driving,” Personality and Individual Differences,
Vol. 34, pp. 159-176.
U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (2008),
http://www.truckinjunes.com/truck-driverfatigue.html.
Van Cauter, E. and Turek, F.W. (1990), “Strategies for
Resetting the Human Circadian Clock,” New
England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 322, No. 18, pp.
1306-1307.
WERC (2004), “Under the Gun: As the New Trucking
Hours-of-Service Rules Takes Hold, Is the
Warehousing Industry Ready?,” WERC Sheet,
March, pp. 1-3.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Hokey Min is James R. Good chair in Global Supply Chain Strategy in the Department of Management at
Bowling Green State University. He was professor ofsupply chain management, distinguished university scholar
and founding director of the UPS Center for World-wide Supply Chain Management and the Center for Supply
Chain Workforce Development at the University of Louisville. Dr. Min earned his Ph.D. degree in management
sciences and logistics from the Ohio State University. His research interests include global logistics strategy, esynchronized supply chain, benchmarking, and supply chain modeling. He has published more than 100 articles
in various refereed journals including European Journal of Operational Research, Journal of Business Logistics,
Journal of the Operational Research Society, Transportation Journal, Journal of Transportation Management,
and Transportation Research._______________________________________

Fall 2009

63

